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This article aims to provide an account of British Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson’s diplomatic attempts to settle the 
Vietnam War. There are some previous studies discussing his 
initiatives in 1965, but little research focussing on his 
continuous trials in the following years. Starting with an 
analysis of Wilson’s concept of an Anglo-American ‘division of 
function’ in Vietnam, this article then examines Anglo-Soviet 
summit meetings in 1966-67 and investigates the Wilson-
Johnson confrontation over America’s secret efforts at a 
dialogue with the Hanoi regime. In conclusion, it will consider 
the factors contributing to the ultimate failure to produce 
significant results of Wilson’s peace-making efforts. 
 
Introduction 
‘Neither side can expect victory in the struggle. Equally 
neither side need expect defeat. The United States have no 
national interest involved in Vietnam. …[T]hey are ready to 
leave provided they can do so without loss of prestige’.1 This 
was British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s view of the 
Vietnam War and the motivation behind his pursuit of a 
negotiated settlement of the Far Eastern conflict. He feared its 
escalation into ‘a major land war, or even a nuclear conflict in 
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1 The National Archive, Kew [hereafter TNA PRO] PREM13/695, Wilson to 
Paymaster General, 22 June 1965. 
Asia’ and was anxious to prevent the Asian war from 
‘poisoning world relationships’ in other parts of the globe.2 
As earlier studies have shown, from the outset of his 
government, Wilson was keen to play a role in mediating the 
Vietnam War, and made several attempts at restoring peace in 
1965.3 This article aims to provide an account of his extensive 
efforts in the following years.4 In doing so, it focuses on his 
personal contacts with American and Soviet leaders at the top 
level. While the existing literature on this topic tends to focus 
on London’s efforts to restrain US military escalation in 
Vietnam, this article pays equal regard to Wilson’s eagerness 
to engage the Soviet leadership in the resolution of the Far 
Eastern conflict and the implications of deteriorating Sino-
Soviet relations for his Vietnamese policy.  
Amongst the questions investigated in this article are: 
what the Prime Minister’s intellectual basis for his mediating 
diplomacy was; to what extent his policy assumption fitted 
the reality of the day; and why his peace-making effort, in the 
end, failed. The analysis here will give not only a detailed 
account of Wilson’s diplomacy towards Vietnam, but also 
some clues to understanding the dynamics of international 
politics in the mid-1960s, such as the ever increasing Anglo-
 
2 TNA PRO PREM13/695, record of a conversation between Wilson and Sayed 
Marei, 28 June 1965. 
3 Simon Kear, ‘The British Consulate-General in Hanoi, 1954-73’, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, Vol. 10 No. 1 (Mar.1999), pp. 215-39; Rolf Steininger, ‘“The 
Americans are in a Hopeless Position”: Great Britain and the War in Vietnam, 
1964-65’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol 8:No.3, (November 1997), pp.237-85; John 
W. Young, ‘The Wilson Government and the Davies Peace Mission to North 
Vietnam, July 1965’, Review of International Studies, Vol.24 (1988), pp.545-62. 
4 Silvia Ellis’s recently published book is an exception in that it covers the 
entire process of Wilson’s policy with regard to the Vietnam War beyond 1965. 
See Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam War (West Port: Praeger, 
2004). 
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American power gap, closer US-Soviet relations and an 
intensifying Sino-Soviet rivalry. 
 
Wilson’s Aims 
In trying to understand Wilson’s enthusiasm for a negotiated 
settlement of the Vietnam War, it is important to note that he 
conducted his personal initiative based upon a certain 
premise. In his memoirs, the Prime Minister emphasises that 
British diplomatic mediation was predicated on his notion of 
an Anglo-American ‘division of function’. He had reached this 
tacit understanding with US President Lyndon B. Johnson at 
the UK-US summit meeting of April 1965:  
[T]hese April talks set out a division of function 
which he [Johnson] more than once stressed 
publicly. The American Government would not 
be deflected from its military task; but, equally, 
he would give full backing to any British 
initiative which had any chance of getting peace-
talks on the move.5  
For Wilson, it was quite natural that he would 
harbour this sense of a British responsibility in the Far East. 
Traditionally, all his predecessors, from Clement Attlee to 
Harold Macmillan, had recognised that Britain should exercise 
a moderating influence on US military actions in the region, 
and, on such occasions as the Korean War, the Indochina 
conflict and the Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s and the Laos 
crisis in 1961-2, British prime ministers had played a crucial 
role in opening negotiations with the communists.6 Wilson 
                                                 
eJournal of International History (March 2005) 
 4
                                                                                             
attached great significance to the Anglo-Soviet co-operation 
established by the Eden-Molotov co-chairmanship of the 
Geneva conference of 1954 during the Indochina crisis, and he 
was determined that his own efforts should build upon this.  
In addition to the UK’s traditional role in Asia, 
Wilson had a particularly strong desire for, and felt the 
necessity of, a British diplomatic involvement in Vietnam. He 
had become prime minister at a time when the foundations of 
the UK’s international power had been diminished in the 
wake of the liquidation of the British Empire, and while its 
replacement, the enlarged Commonwealth, was in its infancy 
and London’s association with Western European integration 
remained largely thwarted. Furthermore, the timing was 
crucial in that the Vietnam War was deteriorating just as 
British military disengagement from east of Suez was being 
discussed in the Cabinet.7  
Obliged to make choices between the UK’s 
diminishing power resources and a lingering desire for a 
 
Korean War’ in John W. Young (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill’s Peacetime 
Administration 1951-1955 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988); Kevin 
Ruane, ‘Anthony Eden, British Diplomacy and the Origins of the Geneva 
Conference of 1954’, The Historical Journal, Vol.37 No.1 (1994); Kevin Ruane, 
‘“Containing America”: Aspects of British Foreign Policy and the Cold War in 
South-East Asia’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.7 No.1 (1996); Geoffrey Warner, 
‘From Geneva to Manila: British Policy towards Indochina and SEATO, May-
September 1954’ in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Dennis Artaud and Mark R. Rubin 
(eds.), Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954-1955 
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1990).  
7 For Britain’s withdrawal from east of Suez, see for example, Philip Darby, 
British Defence Policy East of Suez (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Saki 
Dockrill, ‘Britain’s Power and Influence: Dealing with Three Roles and the 
Wilson Government’s Defence Debate at Chequers in November 1964’, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.11 No.1 (March 2000); Jeffrey Pickering, Britain’s 
Withdrawal from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrenchment (London: Macmillan, 
1998).  
5 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971), pp.95-6. 
6 Michael Dockrill, ‘Britain and the First Chinese Offshore Islands Crisis, 1945-
55’ in Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (eds.), British Foreign Policy, 1945-56 
(London: Macmillan, 1989), pp.173-196; Peter Lowe, ‘The Settlement of the 
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strong international role, the Wilson administration felt 
compelled to demonstrate her usefulness to the world, and the 
Vietnam War seemed to provide a prime opportunity for this. 
As much a matter of his concern over an escalation of the 
Asian conflict, thus, was Wilson’s eagerness for its diplomatic 
settlement augmented by his determination to prove Britain’s 
world-wide capacity. 
As post-war Anglo-American relations suggest that 
the UK’s self-image as America’s dependable ally was one not 
always shared by US administrations, it seems problematic 
that Wilson’s notion of the US-UK division of labour was fully 
appreciated by the Johnson government. From our vantage 
point, we know that there were several early indications of the 
President’s hesitancy to allow the British Prime Minister to be 
America’s special envoy to the Communist world. For one 
thing, on a personal level, the Wilson-Johnson relationship 
was not characterised by perfect chemistry, nor did it develop 
into a more intimate one later on. As US Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk recalls, the President had an ‘underlying mistrust’ 
of Wilson’s capacity to ‘accurately reflect his views’.8 In the 
British Foreign Office as well, it was acknowledged that 
‘[g]iven the President’s secretive nature, high-level 
approaches to him [were] difficult’ and that ‘it would be 
optimistic to expect the right to be informed in close detail and 
still less to be able to exercise a veto over United States 
actions’.9 These observations on UK-US relations at the top 
level justify Ellis’s characterisation of the Wilson-Johnson 
personal relationship as being ‘limited, at best’ and ‘certainly 
one-sided’ in the sense that the British prime minister desired 
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to have as frequent contact with the President as possible, 
while Johnson wanted to ‘avoid or minimise’ his exchanges 
with his British counterpart.10 
 The rather strained personal relationship of the two 
leaders manifested itself in a telephone conversation in 
February 1965. Anxious about America’s military step-up 
following the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in Congress the 
previous August, Wilson proposed a UK-US summit to 
discuss Vietnamese issues. Johnson’s categorical rejection of 
Britain’s counsel shocked Wilson, who considered himself an 
‘extremely loyal’ ally to the US. The President said bluntly: 
‘The President of America rushing to the UK to ask their 
advice might just look overdramatic in the eyes of the 
world…. I won’t tell you how to run Malaysia and you don’t 
tell us how to run Vietnam’, and followed this up with a 
demand for a military contribution from London, in order to 
combat Vietnamese guerrillas.11  
This episode shows the difficulty of the British 
having an effective voice in White House decision-making 
without having to commit their troops on the battleground. 
From the US point of view, Britain’s mere utterances of moral 
support were far from satisfactory given the fact that the UK 
was a signatory to Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO), which covered South Vietnamese security. The 
British military detachment could undermine the credibility of 
the Western collective defence system. Some years later, Rusk 
revealed the extent of American irritation at that time and 
posed a question to Britain’s Minister of Defence Dennis 
 
10 Sylvia A. Ellis, ‘Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War: a 
Not So Special Relationship?’ in Jonathan Hollowell (ed.), Twentieth Century 
Anglo-American Relations (London: Palgrave, 2001), pp.184-5. 8 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It: A Secretary of State’s Memoirs (London: I.B. Tauris & 
Co, 1991), p.409. 11 TNA PRO PREM13/598, record of a telephone conversation between Wilson 
and Johnson, 11 Feb. 1965. 9 TNA PRO PREM13/695, ‘Anglo-American Relations’ (undated). 
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Healey: ‘What if the American reaction to an act of aggression 
under NATO protection was the same as the British reaction 
under SEATO?’ The British Minister awkwardly evaded the 
query by commenting that it was ‘an “indecent question”’.12 
No doubt, Britain’s refusal to provide military assistance to 
the US troops seriously diminished her influence with the 
Johnson administration, which tended to ‘value allies not for 
any sentimental reasons but to the extent of their practical 
contributions to the western alliance.’13 
Recently published studies point to various 
constraints forcing the Wilson government’s continued refusal 
to participate in US military operations. At the heart of the 
British unwillingness were two main reasons: domestic and 
external. First, as John Young and Sylvia Ellis have argued, 
throughout the period examined here the government in 
London was confronted with a hostile domestic public, 
heavily denouncing US military involvement and demanding 
Britain’s detachment from her wrong-headed ally. As time 
passed, more frequent anti-war demonstrations were to be 
witnessed and, to make matters worse, the Labour Party itself 
was deeply divided; Wilson was under the constant strain of 
dissent within his own party in Parliament over policy 
towards Vietnam. In order to pacify an antagonistic public 
and his Labour opponents, the Prime Minister endeavoured to 
create a pubic image of himself as a keen promoter of peace in 
Vietnam while carefully avoiding being branded as 
sympathetic to US military actions.14  
                                                 
eJournal of International History (March 2005) 
 8
                                                
Second, on the external factor front, it must be 
considered that, since the early 1960s, Britain had been faced 
with Indonesian President Sukarno’s ‘confrontation’ policy, 
designed to block the establishment of Malaysia out of fear of 
the expansion of her neighbour under British influence. From 
the early 1960s to mid-1966, London had been preoccupied 
with that part of Southeast Asia through military campaigns 
against Indonesia, involving over 50,000 troops at its peak. 
With diminishing financial resources, the Wilson government 
could not afford to deal simultaneously with the two fronts in 
Southeast Asia, and naturally decided to concentrate the UK’s 
energies on resisting Sukarno for the defence of the infant 
Malaysia, which held more direct British interests. Although 
there was no formal agreement reached between the UK and 
the US, the Wilson government insisted on an Anglo-
American division of labour in Southeast Asia, with Britain 
bearing the burden of defending Malaysia and the US 
assuming chief responsibility for fighting the Vietnamese 
communists. Even if temporarily, this formula for 
compromise helped justify Britain’s minimal military presence 
in Vietnam, despite the fact that Johnson became increasingly 
irritated with Wilson’s non-committal stance.15  
Under these gradually intensifying constraints at 
home and abroad and with the UK-US division of labour in 
mind, Wilson embarked upon a series of attempts at 
meditating the warring parties in Vietnam in the second 
quarter of 1965. In the middle of April he made an attempt to 
 
12 Rusk, As I Saw It, p.395. 15 For Britain’s policy towards Sukarno’s ‘Confrontation’, see for instance, John 
Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand 
Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-5 (London: 
Macmillan, 2000); Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia 1961-1965: 
Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
13 Jonathan Colman, ‘The London Ambassadorship of David K. E. Bruce 
during the Wilson-Johnson Years, 1964-68,’ Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol.15 
No.2 (June 2004), p.334. 
14 John W. Young, ‘Britain and “LBJ’s War”, 1964-68’, Cold War History, Vol.2 
No.3 (April 2002), pp.76-83; Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam War. 
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lay the groundwork for this mediation by sending former 
foreign secretary Patrick Gordon Walker on a fact-finding 
mission to Southeast Asia. Walker’s visit, however, was 
rejected by the Communist countries of North Vietnam and 
China as a disguised extension of US imperialist policy,16 but 
Wilson quickly entertained another idea: the so-called 
‘Commonwealth Mission’. When the prime ministers of the 
Commonwealth countries met in London that June, Wilson 
exploited this top-level meeting to garner support for his 
mediation in the Vietnam War, and succeeded in establishing 
a mission composed of four prime ministers from Britain, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Trinidad-Tobago. Once again, however, 
Wilson’s plan met with rejection from the Asian communists. 
In a final effort to salvage the plan, Wilson despatched Harold 
Davies, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions 
and National Insurance, to Hanoi in early July. Davies had 
been a regular visitor to Hanoi and kept contact with two 
North Vietnamese officials in London, who called themselves 
journalists.17 As described by Young, however, the Harold 
Davies tour ended as yet another failure, with Davies unable 
to meet any key figures in power in Hanoi.18 
Thus, while the first half of 1965 had witnessed 
unsuccessful attempts on the part of the British to resolve the 
problem of Vietnam, towards the end of the year the US 
government began to show some interest in a political 
solution to the war. Though largely ‘propaganda’ exercises to 
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‘improve the American image’ in the eyes of world opinion,19 
President Johnson declared that he ‘d[id] not want to leave 
any stone unturned in the search for peace’.20 For example, 
during the 37-day truce starting on Christmas Eve in 1965, the 
US launched a ‘peace offensive’, and such figures as Vice-
President Hubert Humphrey, National Security Advisor 
McGeorge Bundy, Governor Averell Harriman and the US 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, 
travelled to 14 countries in order to probe possible leads to 
peace.21  
In light of these American initiatives, it should be 
remembered that the fundamental problem Wilson faced 
during the period under discussion was not in fact a refusal 
on the part of Washington to negotiate with the North 
Vietnamese. Rather, the central issue was, as we shall see 
below, a lack of co-ordination between UK and US peace 
efforts and a feeling on the British side that they were being 
circumvented by the Americans, who kept their own missions 
secret from London. As Wilson later complained, America’s 
Christmas peace offensive itself had never been presented to 
his government in advance for discussion, or even as a point 
of information.22 
                                                 
19 David M. Barrett (ed.), Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam Papers: A Documentary 
Collection (Austin, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), note of the 
President’s meeting with foreign policy advisers 18 Dec. 1965, p.291; Chester 
L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: The Full Story of US Involvement in Vietnam from 
Roosevelt to Nixon (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1970), p.293. 
20 TNA PRO PREM13/1271, Johnson to Wilson, 29 July 1965. 16 TNA PRO FO371/180587, ‘Viet-Nam and Negotiations’ by James Cable, 12 
July 1965. 21 For Johnson’s peace probing efforts, see Rusk, As I Saw It, p.405; Cooper, The 
Lost Crusade, chapters 12-14; W. Averell Harriman, America and Russia in a 
Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1971), pp.76-156.  
17 TNA PRO FO371/180569, ‘Proposed visit by Mr Harold Davies, M.P to 
Hanoi,’ 1 July 1965. 
18 For these successive attempts by the Wilson administration, see Young, ‘The 
Wilson Government and the Davies Peace Mission to North Vietnam, July 
1965’; Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970, chapter 8. 
22 TNA PRO PREM13/1917, record of conversation between Wilson and the US 
ambassador David Bruce, 10 Jan. 1967. 
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 At the end of 1965, however, this poor UK-US 
communication had not yet come to the fore. Inside the White 
House, there were those such as Rusk and Bundy who 
prompted the President to keep the British informed of his 
Vietnamese policy. Unlike France’s Charles de Gaulle,23 who 
had been a sharp critic of US policy, the UK was an ally ‘of 
real value’ in spite of her refusal to military commitment. ‘The 
only price’ the US would pay for the ally was, they claimed, 
‘to keep the British on board’ and to give them ‘the feeling 
that they are in the know as we go ahead’.24 And indeed, the 
year 1965 ended with a demonstration of Anglo-American 
unity over Vietnam. During his stay in Washington, Wilson 
joined Johnson in lighting the White House Christmas tree, 
and obtained the President’s public reassurance of his ‘full 
support’ for British peace-making endeavours. ‘It was a far cry 
from that hot-line explosion ten months [ago]’, the Prime 
Minister was pleased to remark.25 Although at this point still 
ignorant of Johnson’s planned ‘peace offensive’, it was with a 
sense of Johnson’s full confidence in his initiative that Wilson 
embarked on two Anglo-Soviet summit conferences in 1966. 
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The Anglo-Soviet Talks of 1966 
On 2 January 1966, taking advantage of the US bombing 
cessation, Wilson appealed to Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to resume Anglo-
Soviet co-operation over Vietnam. As co-chairmen of the 
Geneva conference, the two countries, Wilson reasoned, 
should feel compelled to persuade their allied powers to enter 
into a dialogue. The Prime Minister assured the Soviet leader 
that the Americans were ‘in dead earnest’ to restore peace and 
proposed a visit to Moscow in order to lay the ground for 
wider negotiations.26 Although it was hardly anticipated that 
this top-level exchange of opinion would yield any immediate 
results,27 Wilson was keen to invest his energies in cultivating 
a Soviet channel.  
 In the formulation of Wilson’s decision to approach 
Moscow, there are two points worthy of special attention. 
First, it seems that Wilson had learnt a lesson from his several 
failed attempts at a British direct involvement in Vietnamese 
conflict resolution the previous year and instead shifted to 
indirect contacts with the North Vietnamese authorities. All of 
Wilson’s attempts at a direct engagement described in 1965, 
however, had either been ignored by the Asian Communist 
powers or had come to nothing. As soon as Harold Davies’s 
mission failed in July 1965, therefore, Wilson reoriented his 
Vietnam policy and decided to adopt an indirect approach to 
Hanoi, through Moscow.28  
23 For de Gaulle on the Vietnam War, Anne Sa’adah, ‘Idées Simples and Idées 
Fixes: De Gaulle, the United States, and Vietnam’, in Robert O. Paxton and 
Nicholas Wahl (eds.), De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal 
(Oxford: Berg, 1994), pp.295-315. 
 24 Barrett (ed.), Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam Papers, M. Bundy to Johnson, 6 
Mar. 1965, p.134; M. Bundy to Johnson, 3 June 1965, p.164. 26 TNA PRO PREM13/1271, Wilson to Kosygin, 2 Jan. 1966; PREM13/1271, 
record of a conversation between Wilson and the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires 
Vasev, 3 Jan. 1966. 
25 TNA PRO PREM13/1271, record of a conversation between Wilson and 
Johnson, note by Wilson, 17 Dec. 1965; Foreign Relations of the United States 
(hereafter, FRUS), 1964-1968, XII: Western Europe (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 2001), memorandum prepared by the Executive 
Secretary of the State Department (Read), 15-19 Dec. 1965, p.512; Wilson, The 
Labour Government 1964-1970, p.188.  
27 TNA PRO PREM13/598, J.O.Wright to Bridges, 16 July 1965. 
28 TNA PRO PREM13/598, Wilson to Kosygin, 16 July 1965. Each of Wilson’s 
attempts at mediating the Vietnam War was met with rejection by North 
Vietnam and China, and this seemed to have been a fundamental source of 
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 Second, Wilson intended to supplement America’s 
peace efforts through his contact with Moscow. As he told 
Goldberg, Wilson was apprehensive that US peace missions 
had been focused on East European countries such as 
Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia and that the USSR had been 
‘given insufficient information directly’ and ‘might resent 
hearing some of the details first through satellite 
Governments’.29 Moscow ‘should be put more fully in the 
picture’ on the Western initiative, he insisted.30 Yet at the same 
time, Wilson was well aware that Johnson was reluctant at the 
moment to initiate top-level contact with the Soviet regime 
since ‘to do so would invite a negative reaction’, for instance, a 
Chinese accusation of US-Soviet superpower ‘collusion’.31 
Accordingly, he aimed to fill the gap in America’s Vietnamese 
policy and to achieve the ‘orchestration’ of UK and US actions. 
Specifically, he wished to see ‘a double move’ by Britain and 
America: While the US would try to establish communication 
with Moscow at the foreign ministers’ level with Gromyko, for 
the purpose of setting out the US position on Vietnam, the UK 
would attempt to strengthen top-level contact with Kosygin 
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and revive the Geneva conference.32 Britain’s own efforts, 
Wilson argued, should be concentrated on Hanoi and 
Moscow, ‘the two capitals where there [was] hope of exerting 
some influence for peace’.33 After the failures of direct contact 
with Hanoi, he judged it more realistic to take a path via 
Moscow to North Vietnam. 
 On 22 February, Wilson landed in the Soviet capital 
and stayed for several days. At meetings with Kosygin and 
N.V. Podgorny, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet, he began discussions by sketching the history of 
Anglo-Soviet relations and the current world situation. 
According to the British Prime Minister, UK-Soviet relations 
‘had always been symbolic of relations generally in the world’ 
and ‘they could be a causal factor in bringing an improvement 
or a deterioration in [those] relations,’ which suggested that a 
stability in Vietnam would be considerably dependent upon 
the two powers’ co-operation.  
Wilson then pointed out two outstanding 
phenomena featured in the decade from 1955 to 1965 and 
recent drastic changes in ‘the balance of world problems.’ 
Within this decade ‘the thermo-nuclear striking power’ of the 
East and the West ‘had become so great and so balanced that 
each side recognised that a thermo-nuclear war would 
virtually destroy the world’. In addition to the emergence of 
this balance of terror, the years also had witnessed ‘the 
growing importance of Asia and Africa on the world stage 
and the corresponding diminution of the status of Europe as 
the centre of the world and its problems’. ‘[L]ooking forward 
frustration in Britain’s Vietnamese policy. It can be argued that North 
Vietnamese and Chinese either ignorance of, or opposition to, Wilson’s plans 
drove him to rely exclusively upon Moscow as a point of contact in the 
communist world, which in turn, unfortunately, proved to further antagonise 
the two Asian powers. For China’s policy towards the Vietnam War and its 
reaction to the British response, see for example, Chen Jian, ‘China’s 
Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69’, China Quarterly, Vol.142 (June 
1995), pp. 356-387; Yang Kuisong, ‘Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude toward 
the Indochina War, 1949-1973’, Cold War International History Project, working 
paper no.34 (February 2002); Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-
1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).  
29 TNA PRO PREM13/1271, note of a conversation between Wilson and 
Goldberg, 3 Jan. 1966. 
32 TNA PRO PREM13/1271, note of a conversation between Wilson and 
Ambassador Goldberg, 3 Jan. 1966. 
30 TNA PRO PREM13/1271, Derek Mitchel to McGeorge Bundy, 2 Jan. 1966. 33 TNA PRO PREM13/1271, Wilson to the President of Italian Republic, 6 Jan. 
1966. 31 TNA PRO PREM13/1271, 2 Jan. 1966. 
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over the next 10 years’, Wilson predicted ‘a further shift of the 
forces of danger from Europe to the third world – to Africa 
and Asia’. In specific terms, ‘[r]ace, colour, and the desire to 
assert the dignity of man would…present serious problems in 
the coming years’.34 
 This recognition of the Vietnam War as a new form of 
international conflict, although previously unacknowledged 
as being such in studies to date, was another factor 
intensifying Wilson’s sense of urgency in dealing with it. His 
objective in sketching the past and future international 
situation was to drive home the point that the Vietnam War 
had to be understood in this context of world transformation 
and so must be treated as a test case similar to problems lying 
in the period ahead. ‘While the balance of nuclear power 
created an uneasy stability which…made war in Europe more 
unlikely, the world was becoming dominated by …problem[s] 
of …developing countries.’35 In the coming era, Britain and the 
Soviet Union would have a greater responsibility for assisting 
developing countries in settling their issues. 
 To Wilson’s disappointment, however, Kosygin made 
clear that the Soviet government had no readiness for 
diplomatic intervention without a North Vietnamese official 
request for it. Given Hanoi’s repeated assertion that it would 
not open peace negotiations until the US had stopped ‘the acts 
of aggression’ and had withdrawn from ‘the soil of Vietnam’, 
it was hardly possible for the USSR to call for a conference 
with Britain. Kosygin, even while frankly admitting that his 
                                                 
eJournal of International History (March 2005) 
 16
                                                
government was supplying arms to Hanoi ‘on an increasing 
scale’, expressed his determination to continue ‘all possible 
help’.36 Throughout Wilson’s stay, the Soviet leaders thus took 
a non-committal attitude towards diplomatic collaboration 
with London. The chance of Anglo-Soviet co-operation 
became even slimmer when the Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Lord Chalfont, who had accompanied the Prime 
Minister in Moscow, encountered a North Vietnamese chargé 
d’affaires’ categorical rejection of negotiations with the USA.37 
 As his telegrams to Johnson show, Wilson found 
‘absolutely no progress at all’ on Vietnam38 and expected that 
‘there would be no give in the Russian attitude’ in the near 
future.39 Despite a want of substantial progress, however, he 
enjoyed private conversations with the Soviet leaders and left 
the Russian territory optimistic about a future improvement in 
UK-Soviet collaboration. From the outset, Wilson had not 
expected anything spectacular to come out of these meetings, 
as he believed the Kremlin was still involved in ‘trying to 
establish their influence in Hanoi’.40 Rather sympathetic to the 
Soviet communists, Wilson confided to the US government his 
belief that Moscow’s reluctance to exert influence on the 
North Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, was due not to their 
 
36 TNA PRO PREM13/1216, record of a meeting between Wilson and Kosygin 
at 10 a.m., 22 Feb. 1966; PREM13/1216, record of a meeting between Wilson 
and Kosygin, 23 Feb. 1966. 
37 TNA PRO PREM13/1216, record of a meeting between Lord Chalfont and 
the North Vietnamese chargé d’affaires in Moscow, 23 Feb. 1966; CAB128/41, 24 
Feb. 1966. This meeting between the UK and the North Vietnamese 
representative had been proposed by British Foreign Secretary, Michael 
Stewart. PREM13/1272, PM66/13, Stewart to Wilson, 10 Feb. 1966 
34 TNA PRO PREM13/1216, record of a meeting between Wilson and 
Podgorny, 22 Feb. 1966. 
38 TNA PRO PREM13/1216, text of personal message from Wilson to Johnson, 
26 Feb. 1966. 
TNA PRO PREM13/1216, record of a meeting between Wilson and Kosygin at 
10 a.m., 22 Feb. 1966. 
39 TNA PRO PREM13/1272, Wilson to Johnson, 23 Feb. 1966. 35 TNA PRO PREM13/1216, record of a meeting between Wilson and 
Podgorny, 22 Feb. 1966. 40 TNA PRO PREM13/1272, Wilson’s letter to Jens Otto, 18 Jan. 1966. 
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lack of interest in peace in Vietnam but to their concern about 
the 23rd Party Conference only a month away. For the 
Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership, it was their ‘maiden 
performances’, and they would not wish to indicate any 
appearance of ‘appeasing the capitalist world’.41 Taking this 
Soviet limitation into account, Wilson’s main purpose in the 
current trip was to renew his personal relations with Soviet 
leaders, particularly with Kosygin, whom Wilson had known 
for 20 years since their trade negotiations in 1947. Wilson left 
the Soviet Union with ‘a much clearer personal knowledge of 
the men’ in the Kremlin, which was ‘a very good thing in 
itself’.42 
 Johnson appreciated Wilson’s efforts in Moscow and 
encouraged the Prime Minister to keep ‘hammering away’.43 
America’s continued support for Britain’s mediating role was 
repeated by Harriman during his visit to London in early 
May. The President’s emissary stressed how grateful Johnson 
was for Britain’s support of his Vietnamese policy, ‘to a much 
greater degree than from America’s other European allies’. 
Perhaps partly pleased by this American appreciation, Wilson 
came to feel that he had ‘an excellent informal relationship 
with the President’ by the summer of 1966.44 
 Despite Johnson’s remarks of encouragement, it is 
unclear to what extent the US administration actually looked 
to the Anglo-Soviet channel as a means to peace as the US 
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policy-makers recognised that the Soviets would be unable to 
take any decisive action towards a diplomatic settlement. 
Although it was possible that the national interests of the US 
and the USSR might converge to prevent disorder in the Third 
World and that the two countries could take ‘parallel action’ 
in the region,45 superpower understandings in Vietnam were 
deterred by the intensifying Sino-Soviet rivalry. By then, 
Vietnam was a battleground on which the two Communist 
powers were vying for leadership, and the Soviets were 
careful not to give the Chinese any pretext for attacking their 
actions as being pro-Western. Moscow was now ‘engaged in a 
two-front cold war’ with the US and China, and the leaders in 
the Kremlin had to proceed cautiously to ensure that neither 
of the two rivals would ‘come out on top’ in Vietnam.46 
 Unaware of these American views, Wilson paid his 
second visit to Moscow in mid-July. The visit was prompted 
by his fear of the escalating American military offensive. US 
bombings on city regions in Hanoi and Haiphong in June 
provoked a world-wide outcry and Wilson articulated a 
British ‘dissociation’ from the military conduct in the House of 
Commons.47  
In Moscow, he was confronted with Kosygin’s 
outpourings of anger at American aggression. The Soviet 
premier repeatedly condemned Johnson as ‘a sick man’ and ‘a 
madman’, comparing the recent bombings to Benito 
 
45 FRUS, 1964-1968, XIV: The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: United States 
Government Printing Office, 2001), ‘Prospect for détente with the USSR’, 23 
Mar. 1966, p.384. 
41 TNA PRO PREM13/1273, record of a conversation between Wilson and 
Governor Harriman, 4 May 1966. 
42 TNA PRO PREM13/1216, text of personal message from Wilson to Johnson, 
26 Feb. 1966. Wilson judged Kosygin to be ‘a very tough, not very humorous 
administrator’ and Brezhnev to be ‘a very impressive more extrovert figure’. 
46 FRUS, 1964-1968, XIV, memorandum from the Ambassador at Large 
(Thompson) to Johnson, 15 July 1966, pp.404-5; FRUS, 1964-1968, XIV, 
‘Current Soviet attitudes toward the US’, 28 July 1966, p.408. 43 TNA PRO PREM13/1216, Johnson to Wilson, 3 Mar. 1966. 
47 House of Commons Parliamentary Debates: Weekly Hansard (hereafter, Hansard), 
no.692, 29 June 1966, col.1796. 
44 TNA PRO PREM13/1273, record of a conversation between Wilson and 
Harriman, 4 May, 1966. 
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Mussolini’s unrestricted assaults on civilians in Ethiopia 
during the Abyssinia War in the 1930s.48 
 Preceded by this ill-timed US military operation, the 
top-level meeting reached no significant agreements on 
Vietnam. The Soviets only repeated their stance expressed in 
the February talks.49 Yet, one interesting point emerged that is 
of relevance to this study, and that is a Wilson-Kosygin debate 
on how the British government could best exert influence on 
Washington. Simply put, the leaders discussed whether 
London’s association with or dissociation from Washington 
could better influence US decision-making. Referring to de 
Gaulle’s policy of independence from America, Kosygin 
urged Wilson to detach himself from American policy and 
argued that, in doing so, Britain would be capable of 
increasing her leverage with Washington and of enhancing 
her credibility as an honest broker in East-West relations.50 If 
Britain continued to acquiesce, the US would come to think 
that they would have no need to ‘take any notice’ of London’s 
view.  
Wilson disagreed with the Soviet view, claiming that 
the contrary was the case. ‘[I]n practice’, Britain’s capacity to 
influence American policy depended on ‘the extent to which 
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[the British] gave their general support to United States policy 
as a whole’.51 The Labour Prime Minister shared a view 
commonly held by post-war British governments that ‘[o]nce 
the Americans feel that we are with them, they are then far 
more susceptible to advice and influence and there is much 
less talk about dragging of feet’.52 It is unknown whether 
Kosygin’s call for British detachment from the US was a 
variation on traditional Soviet wedge-driving or a reflection of 
his genuine interest in London’s more flexible position. At any 
rate, the Soviet premier concluded that the time was not ripe 
yet for a peace negotiation led by their two governments. 
 As in the February talks, Wilson remained optimistic 
about UK-Soviet relations on Vietnam in spite of his failure to 
pin down Kosygin to any concrete promises. ‘Agreement’ 
between the two countries was ‘still beyond [their] grasp’, but 
was nonetheless confident that ‘we share a belief in the value 
of these periodical exchanges’ at the top level53 and was ‘more 
convinced than ever that the sort of unsensational [sic] 
relationship that is growing up between Kosygin and myself 
has real – if still largely potential – value’.54  
 Why was Wilson so optimistic about his relationship 
with the Soviet communists? On a practical note, he had 
acquired nothing from them and, as he himself admitted, ‘the 
 48 TNA PRO PREM13/1218, record of a conversation between Wilson and 
Kosygin at 5.15 p.m., 16 July 1966; PREM13/1276; PREM13/1218, record of a 
conversation between Wilson and Kosygin before lunch, 18 July 1966; 
PREM13/1218, note of a conversation between Wilson and Kosygin during the 
banquet in the Kremlin on the evening of Monday, 18 July 1966. 
51 TNA PRO PREM13/1276, record of conversation between Wilson and 
Kosygin at 5 p.m., 18 July 1966; PREM13/1218, record of a conversation 
between Wilson and Kosygin before lunch, 18 July 1966; PREM13/1218, note 
of a conversation between Wilson and Kosygin during the banquet in the 
Kremlin on the evening of Monday, 18 July 1966. 49 TNA PRO PREM13/1218, record of a meeting between Wilson and Kosygin 
at 10 p.m., 18 July 1966. 52 This is a remark by Sir Roger Makins, the British ambassador to the US in 
mid-1950s. Papers of the 1st Earl of Avon, Birmingham University Library, 
Birmingham, AP20/17/223, Makins to Eden, 16 Dec. 1954. 
50 As Ilya V. Gaiduk suggests, the Soviet government appears to have been 
more interested in de Gaulle’s France than in Britain regarding the Vietnam 
problem as the French President, eager to become independent of the United 
States, could be used for its own purposes. Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union 
and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), pp.77-78 and 268 (note 11). 
53 TNA PRO PREM13/1218, Wilson to Kosygin, 19 July 1966. 
54 TNA PRO PREM13/1218, text of a message from Wilson to Johnson, 19 July 
1966. 
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likelihood of any negotiations on Vietnam in the near future 
[was] still very remote’.55 One explanation may be that the 
Prime Minister was much impressed by Soviet ‘frankness’ in 
informal talks.56 Every post-war Conservative prime minister, 
Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan, 
had held a firm conviction that vital issues with the USSR 
were more likely to be solved in personal, informal discussion, 
and indeed they often appeared to be under a Soviet ‘spell’.57 
Wilson too was drawn by the evident charm of the Soviet 
leaders in these private sessions and, as Kosygin emphasised 
‘again and again’ his government’s deep concern about the 
Vietnam War, Wilson was led to believe that his ‘long, private 
talk’ with Moscow’s leaders would ‘come in some way and at 
some stage, to serve the cause of peace in Vietnam’.58  
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Wilson believed that the Soviets had a genuine 
desire for a Vietnamese settlement but that the radical Chinese 
leadership, that was ‘willing to continue the war to the last 
drop of Viet-Namese blood’,59 would hamper Moscow’s 
progress towards the goal. Yet, this impression of his was 
based on intuition rather than on any tangible evidence from 
the USSR. In fact, he was uncertain whether the North 
Vietnamese regime was pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese or 
independent, and had no clear idea how much influence the 
Kremlin actually wielded with Hanoi.60 As far as British 
official documents are concerned, there are few records to 
show that the Prime Minister tried to delve critically into the 
Soviet mind, hardly suspecting that the communists might be 
capitalising on the opportunity of the Vietnam War to exhaust 
American military and economic resources and generate 
international criticism of the US. On the American side, 
however, some officials such as Foy Kohler, the ambassador to 
the USSR, warned against viewing the Soviets as ‘good guys’ 
and the Chinese as ‘bad guys’ in Vietnam.61 It is important to 
bear in mind, thus, that Wilson did not necessarily have any 
solid evidence of any real Soviet influence with the North 
Vietnamese authorities.  
55 TNA PRO PREM13/1218, note by Wilson, 3 Aug. 1966. 
56 TNA PRO PREM13/1218, extract from record of meeting between Wilson 
and Johnson, 29 July 1966. 
57 Evidence to show post-war British prime ministers attached special 
significance to informal contact with Soviet leaders abounds. For Churchill’s 
great interest in personal contacts with the Soviet leadership, see John W. 
Young, Winston Churchill’s Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951-55 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). Eden writes in his memoirs: ‘in my 
experience, it was informal contacts with the Russians which were the more 
useful. This was especially true if, for internal reasons or otherwise, the 
Soviets were more disposed for serious discussion of our differences than 
they had been at any time since the war.’ The Earl of Avon, The Memoirs of Sir 
Anthony Eden: Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p.291. Macmillan wrote: 
‘there is always the chance…of some useful by-product emerging in the 
course of …less formal discussions. It may happen that in such conversations 
among the Heads a phrase or a sentiment may emerge which will give us a 
line as to where we could most usefully probe a little further or where we 
might hope for possible concessions.’ FRUS, 1955-1957, V: Austrian State 
Treaty, Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings (1988), Macmillan to Dulles, 
29 May 1955, p.205.  
 
The ‘Marigold’ Affair 
Following his talks with the Soviet leadership, Wilson paid a 
visit to Johnson and informed him of the Moscow talks. As 
 
59 TNA PRO PREM13/1218, record of a meeting between Wilson and Kosygin 
at 10 a.m., 18 July 1966. 
60 TNA PRO PREM13/695, note of a meeting of Wilson and Pakistan’s 
President Ayub Khan, 19 June 1965; PREM13/1218, PREM13/1276, record of 
conversation between Wilson and Kosygin at 5.00 p.m., 18 July 1966. 
61 FRUS, 1964-1968, XIV, telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union 
(Kohler) to the State Department, 12 July 1966, p.401. 58 TNA PRO PREM13/1218, note by Wilson, 3 Aug. 1966. 
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before, the President expressed appreciation of the British 
efforts and reiterated his commitment to the ‘continuing close 
co-operation’ of their countries in the ‘cause of peace’,62 even 
remarking: 
Lord Palmerston once said that Britain has no 
permanent friends – she has only permanent 
interests. With due respect to that illustrious 
British statesman, I must disagree. For 
Americans, Britain is a permanent friend, and the 
unbreakable link between our two nations is our 
permanent interest.63  
Despite this confirmation of the Anglo-American 
unity of purpose, the Wilson-Johnson meeting in retrospect 
marked the end of relatively stable UK-US relations, and the 
second half of 1966 witnessed their growing disagreement 
over Vietnam. During the latter half of the year, it became 
evident that Johnson had little confidence in British mediating 
diplomacy and the President embarked upon his own secret 
attempts to break the impasse in Vietnam. By the autumn of 
that year, Johnson, for some reason, came to feel that US-
Soviet relations were ‘better at present’ than at any other time 
since his inauguration.64 In October, he had a meeting with 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and the atmosphere 
was friendly. ‘[T]he essence of the conversation’ was that the 
Soviet Minister ‘admitted’ Soviet influence in Hanoi and its 
readiness to use it if the US ceased bombing in Vietnam,65 a 
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disclosure that Moscow had never made to the British. In 
addition, Kosygin told the American ambassador that his 
regime would persist in its policy of peaceful co-existence 
with the United States and registered his wish for closer US-
Soviet contacts. Reciprocating the Soviet gesture, Johnson 
wrote directly to the Soviet premier, maintaining that their 
governments had ‘no basic conflict of interest’ on the Vietnam 
matter.66 
 Yet, it was in the last two months of 1966 that UK-US 
relations were seriously impaired by America’s independent 
exploration of a diplomatic settlement. During these months, 
Washington’s approach to Hanoi via the Polish government, 
code-named ‘Marigold’, reached a critical stage. The origin of 
the Marigold talks dated back to June of that year. By 
introduction of the Italian ambassador to South Vietnam 
Giovanni D’Orlandi, the US ambassador to Saigon, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, had initiated contact with Janusz Lewandowski, 
the Polish representative to the International Control 
Commission, with a channel to Hanoi. On 15 November, 
Lodge presented American conditions for a peace conference 
to Lewandowski who was due to leave shortly for Hanoi. 
Besides the ‘14 points’ declared by Rusk, including free 
elections in South Vietnam and the unification of Vietnam,67 
the US government submitted its ‘Phase A-Phase B’ formula, 
which proposed that the US suspension of bombing (Phase A) 
would be followed ‘after some adequate period’ by ‘the 
execution of all the other agreed de-escalation actions’ on both 
sides (Phase B).68 
62 FRUS, 1964-1968, XII, circular telegram from the State Department to posts 
in NATO capitals, 30 July 1966, p.558.  
p. 428;  63 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson 1966, part 
2 (Washington: United Government Printing Office: 1967), 29 July, 1966, p.791. 66 FRUS, 1964-1968, IV: Vietnam (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1998), Johnson to Kosygin, 6 Dec. 1966, p.908. 64 FRUS, 1964-1968, XIV, memorandum of conversation between Johnson and 
George Brown, 14 Oct. 1966, p.427. 67 For the details of the ‘14 points’, see Rusk, As I Saw It, pp.404-405. 
68 Cooper, The Lost Crusade, p.334. 65 FRUS, 1968-1964, XIV, memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, 14 Oct. 1966, 
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 On returning from Hanoi, Lewandowski reported that 
Hanoi was ready for discussion with the US in Warsaw. Soon, 
preparatory talks between the US and the Polish 
representatives started, but never led to a direct US-North 
Vietnamese dialogue.69 This was partly because of an 
American accusation that the Polish misrepresented the peace 
conditions (Lewandowski had inappropriately reduced 
America’s 14 points to ten and did not relay the Phase A-
Phase B formula to Hanoi) and partly because of Polish 
indignation at the US bombings of Hanoi in early December, 
just a few days before the preparatory meetings were to begin. 
As each side continued to criticise the other, the North 
Vietnamese regime notified Polish Foreign Minister Adam 
Rapacki on 13 December that they would postpone their 
discussion with the US indefinitely.70 America’s rescue 
measure, a pledge of ‘no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi 
city center’, fell on deaf ears in Hanoi.71 At the end of the 
month, with no prospect of progress, Rapacki abandoned his 
attempt to build a bridge between Washington and Hanoi.72 
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 Throughout the entire Marigold initiative, the British 
government had been kept completely in the dark, and it was 
not until the Stewart-Rusk talks of 3 January 1967 that the 
project was brought to the attention of the British. Rusk 
expressed his deep regret at having been unable to consult 
with the UK government, owing to Polish and North 
Vietnamese insistence on ‘absolute secrecy’.73 To be fair to the 
Americans, it should be noted that it was not only Britain but 
also all other US allies who were kept in ignorance of this 
diplomatic trial. Even within the US administration, Johnson 
had ‘ordered a sharp reduction in the number of people 
permitted to reach the relevant telegrams’.74 
 Such secrecy on the part of the US, even though 
inevitable, might have damaged the British self-image as 
America’s special partner. Still worse, the ‘gravity’ of the 
event was ‘compounded’ by British policy-makers’ fear that 
the Soviet leaders had discovered London’s ignorance of the 
Marigold exchanges and had thus begun to doubt British 
credibility as America’s trusted envoy. Indeed, Foreign 
Secretary George Brown, completely ignorant of the American 
project, had visited Moscow on 22-25 November of the 
previous year and delivered the Phase A-Phase B formula as a 
confidential American plan, yet it had been already passed to 
the Polish by Lodge a week earlier.75 There was no question 
69 For the US-Polish preparatory talks in Warsaw in December 1966, see FRUS, 
1966, IV, pp.906-987. 
70 FRUS, 1966, IV, the Embassy in Poland to the State Department, 13 Dec. 
1966, p.933. 
71 FRUS, 1966, IV, the State Department to the Embassy in Poland, 23 Dec. 
1966, p. 969. 
 72 FRUS, 1966, IV, Rostow to Johnson, 30 Dec. 1966, p.983. Hershberg’s article, 
which is the most comprehensive analysis on the ‘Marigold’ affair so far, 
concludes that ‘the reason, responsibility, and blame for its failure to take 
place remains unclear’ while arguing that it should nevertheless not be 
dismissed as a complete ‘sham’ by the communists, as the American 
administration claimed at the time. At any rate, it seems reasonable to say that 
both the Americans and the Polish-North Vietnamese communist side were so 
mistrustful of each other that caution guided each to avoid the risk of being 
deceived by the other in pursuit of a shallow peace in Vietnam. James G. 
Hershberg, with the assistance of L.W.Gluchowski, ‘Who Murdered 
“Marigold”?: New Evidence on the Mysterious Failure of Poland’s Secret 
Initiative to Start U.S.-North Vietnamese Peace Talks, 1966’, Cold War 
International History Project, working paper no.27 (April 2000). 
73 TNA PRO PREM13/1917, Washington to FO, 3 Jan. 1967. 
74 Cooper, The Lost Crusade, pp335, 340. 
75 TNA PRO PREM13/1917, Washington to FO, 3 Jan. 1967; The Americans 
themselves talked about the Marigold initiative with the Soviet ambassador 
Dobrynin. FRUS, 1964-1968, IV, memorandum of conversation, 30 Dec. 1966, 
p.982. 
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that the Soviet leaders had already been informed of the 
Marigold initiative by the Polish government. Tragically, the 
Soviets must have concluded either that Britain ‘did 
not…enjoy full American confidence’ or that the Two-Phase 
formula was Brown’s own and in fact ‘had no American 
backing’.76 The Foreign Secretary’s protest to the White House 
through the ambassador, Patrick Dean, was so fierce that 
‘even those officials in the White House who had become 
somewhat cool to Her Majesty’s Government’s tendency to 
“meddle” in Vietnam felt the need to soothe our angry ally’.77  
 Responding to Wilson’s demand, the US 
administration sent a State Department official, Chester 
Cooper, to deliver a brief on the Marigold affair. The 
American official described the President’s “‘psychotic” state 
about leaks not only in regard to top secret matter…but over 
anything that he wished to keep confidential’, which was 
‘why there had been a total “clamp down”’ on security in the 
Marigold project.78 The Prime Minister was further frustrated 
to learn of another US project, a secret ‘face-to-face dialogue’ 
between US officials and the North Vietnamese chargé 
d’affaires that had begun on 10 January in Moscow.79 In view of 
Kosygin’s scheduled visit to Britain in early February, he was 
concerned to prevent any US ‘disconcerting lack of frankness’ 
during the Anglo-Soviet summit.80 He complained of the 
American unilateral attitude: 
Surely the key to our whole relationship, and the 
mutual support and counsel…and to the concept 
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of partnership…must be total confidence 
between us. I am bound in all honesty to say that, 
in the present case, this confidence seems to me 
to have been lacking.81  
  
The Wilson-Kosygin Meeting of February 1967 
Wilson’s disappointment at the American failure to consult 
his government intensified his zeal for success in the coming 
Anglo-Soviet summit.82 Fortunately for him, the top-level 
meeting started at the beginning of a Tet (Vietnam’s New 
Year) truce. Wilson believed that it was not a mere 
coincidence but rather Kosygin’s intention to take advantage 
of the respite to initiate a wider negotiation.  
 On 6 February, much of the opening day discussion 
centred on Kosygin’s accounts of Soviet-Chinese 
confrontation. The Soviet premier was ‘obsessional [sic] about 
the Chinese problem’, describing relations between the two 
Communist nations as being in ‘the state of economic 
warfare’. ‘China has gone mad’, he feverishly continued, 
‘China is in chaos. China is an organised military dictatorship 
with no ideological principles. China’s aim is not only to 
 
81 TNA PRO PREM13/1917, second draft of Wilson’s message to Johnson 
(undated). For Wilson’s similar comments, see PREM13/1917, record of 
conversation between Wilson and the US ambassador Bruce, 10 Jan. 1967. 
82 For other accounts of the Anglo-Soviet summit meeting of February 1967, 
apart from Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam War, see George C. Herring 
(ed.), The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the 
Pentagon Papers (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), pp.373-516; John 
Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives, 
1966-1967: Marigolds, Sunflowers, and “Kosygin Week,”’ Diplomatic History, 
27:1 (January 2003), pp.113-49, and Kevin Boyle, ’The Price of Peace: 
Vietnam, the Pound, and the Crisis of the American Empire,’ Diplomatic 
History, 27:1 (January 2003), pp.58-70. 
76 TNA PRO PREM13/1917, ‘Vietnam’, 4 Jan. 1967. 
77 Cooper, The Lost Crusade, p.343. 
78 TNA PRO PREM13/1917, record of a conversation with Wilson and Chester 
Cooper, 18 Jan. 1967. 
79 Cooper, The Lost Crusade, pp.345-346.  
80 TNA PRO PREM13/1917, ‘Vietnam’, 4 Jan. 1967. 
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enslave Vietnam but also the whole of Asia’.83 In the light of 
this deepening Chinese thirst for power, Kosygin contended 
that continued Soviet military assistance to Hanoi was 
indispensable to counteract Chinese influence with the North 
Vietnamese regime. So far, Hanoi had managed to stave off 
the Chinese, but a suspension of Soviet aid would facilitate 
Chinese assumption of military control in the war.84  
The problem for the Soviets was, however, not 
confined to the Asian Communist power: America’s escalating 
military offensive provided Beijing with a good pretext for 
expanding her own intervention and strengthened her hand in 
Hanoi’s decision-making. Kosygin emphasised that Britain 
held a key role in preventing an exacerbation of the 
Vietnamese conflict by applying political pressure on 
Washington. Significantly, after some routine comments about 
Britain’s independence from the United States, the Soviet 
leader then referred to the importance of Britain’s ‘closest 
relations’ with America and urged the British not to ‘break or 
even strain [their] relations’ with it.85 This confirmed Wilson’s 
impression that the Kremlin would like to maintain Britain ‘as 
a useful channel to Washington’.86  
 On 10 February, the Anglo-Soviet meeting seemed to 
take a significant step towards a Vietnamese settlement. Until 
then, Kosygin had shown no sign of changing his previous 
stance and refused British calls for a reconvening of the 
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Geneva conference.87 At the morning session of that day, 
however, he indicated great interest in the American Phase A-
Phase B formula, which he had turned down earlier in the 
week, and asked Wilson to give him the proposal in writing.88 
That afternoon, Cooper, with FO officials, drafted the two-
stage formula. The American representative sent it to the State 
Department for authorisation and, in what later turned out to 
be a fatal mistake, judged that the absence of a reply signified 
an endorsement of his draft.89 
 In Cooper’s version of the Phase A-Phase B plan, it 
was postulated that the US ‘will stop bombing North Vietnam 
as soon as they are assured that infiltration from North 
Vietnam to South Vietnam will stop’ and ‘[w]ithin a few days 
of the bombing stopping’ both sides will stop further military 
actions. Although it would be more difficult to observe a 
cessation of North Vietnamese infiltration than a US halt to 
the bombing, it was pledged that the American government 
would ‘not demand any public statement from North 
Vietnam’.90 
 With this proposal and a telegram from Washington 
that the US would extend the Tet truce ‘for a further three 
days’,91 Wilson went to a Soviet Embassy reception on the 
evening of the 10th. By that time, the Prime Minister had 
gained further confidence in the possibility of improving the 
Vietnamese situation, and his excitement led him to put 
 
83 TNA PRO PREM13/2408, Wilson to Johnson, 11 Feb. 1967; PREM13/1840, 
extract from a conversation between Wilson and Kosygin, 6 Feb. 1967; 
PREM13/2408, Wilson to Johnson, 16 Feb. 1967. 
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forward a ‘dramatic’ proposal to the Soviet premier. Wilson 
spelt out his plan that, in order to prompt negotiations based 
on the Phase A-Phase B formula, Kosygin and himself should 
visit Hanoi while Gromyko and Brown would go to 
Washington, and each team would prompt both parties to 
come to the negotiating table. Should the Soviet government 
refuse to join this plan, Wilson would consider making a 
solitary visit to Hanoi. Given his recognition of the Soviet-
Chinese rivalry, it should have been obvious to Wilson that 
such a proposal was not realistic. Kosygin anticipated 
objections to the idea by the North Vietnamese as such a plan 
would certainly provoke the Chinese communists. The point 
that the British Prime Minister had failed to grasp fully was 
that Hanoi ‘had not only to look to their front (the American 
troops)’ but also ‘had to look to their rear (the Chinese).’ 
Although this proposal for Anglo-Soviet joint trips to Hanoi 
and Washington was rejected, the two leaders agreed that 
Kosygin would soon order the Kremlin to transmit the Phase 
A-Phase B plan for North Vietnamese examination.92 
 Things seemed to be going well, and Wilson was 
delighted to find Kosygin in a more amenable frame of mind. 
His optimism about a breakthrough in Vietnam suddenly 
foundered, however, upon receipt of a telegram from 
Washington at 10:30 that night. In the telegram, the White 
House presented a new version of the Phase A-Phase B 
formula, a considerable change from the one Wilson had 
passed to Kosygin just a few hours earlier. There were two 
prominent alterations. First, the new version read: ‘The United 
States will order a cessation of bombing of [the] North as soon 
as they are assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to 
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South Vietnam has stopped’.93 This change of tense from ‘will 
stop’ to ‘has stopped’ meant that a US bombing stoppage was 
now conditional upon Hanoi’s prior termination of infiltration 
into South Vietnam. In short, ‘[t]he sequence of Phase A and 
Phase B had been reversed’ in the new version.94 Second, the 
US now required the North Vietnamese regime publicly to 
announce their stoppage of infiltration. The US willingness to 
accept Hanoi’s assurances on faith, as professed in the earlier 
version, had disappeared.95 The British leaders were shocked 
by the amendments, but there was no time to reflect. Kosygin 
was about to leave on a short trip to Scotland. Wilson hastily 
despatched his secretary, Michael Halls, to Euston railway 
station, where he only just managed to deliver the new 
version to the Soviet premier. 
 The following day, a great political crisis in Anglo-
American relations ensued. Cooper recalls that, in his two-
decade diplomatic career, he had never seen anyone angrier 
than the British Prime Minister was at this time.96 Wilson and 
Brown were not persuaded by the American argument that 
their changes were made entirely on account of continued 
North Vietnamese infiltration during the Tet truce, and were 
seriously concerned that the US failure of communication 
with them had ‘impaired British credibility’ in the eyes of the 
Soviets. The Prime Minister, who had nearly decided to 
declare British ‘dissociation’ from the US conduct at a Cabinet 
meeting that morning, doubted if Johnson really wanted 
peace in Vietnam. Informed that the US might resume 
bombing to block North Vietnamese military movement soon, 
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he became more indignant and spoke to US ambassador 
David Bruce of his readiness to take a ‘more independent line 
in public’. Wilson was firm: ‘Our relationship with the United 
States did not mean that we must automatically back 
everything the Americans did’.97  
Anglo-American relations were now so strained that 
some who observed the situation closely feared ‘another 
Suez’. Cooper commented, ‘Ten years before, during the Suez 
crisis, I had had a ringside seat at a major Washington-London 
squabble. Once again I sensed Anglo-American relations 
dissolving before my eyes.’98 Wilson himself was concerned 
about a re-emergence of the bitterness of the Suez tragedy:  
[I]n his opinion, things might not ever be the 
same again. Trust had been broken. Naturally, 
even if there were an act of dissociation, …Anglo-
American relations would recover. Nevertheless, 
neither side wanted another Suez. It was essential 
for the United States to put matters back on an 
even keel again.99  
His anger unappeased, Wilson sent a letter of protest to 
Johnson:  
You will realise what a hell of a situation I am in 
for my last day of talks with Kosygin. …I have to 
re-establish trust because not only will he have 
doubts about my credibility but he will have lost 
his credibility in Hanoi and possibly among his 
colleagues.  
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The Prime Minister concluded that: ‘he [Kosygin] and I have 
got to move to a slightly more central position, each of us 
loyal to our respective allies but each slightly more capable of 
taking a detached view which he and I could agree we will 
then press on our respective friends’.100 
 Johnson did not shrink. He did not believe that ‘the 
matter hangs on the tense of verbs’, reasoning that Hanoi had 
been familiar with the Phase A-Phase B formula since the 
Marigold initiative but had never shown the slightest sign of 
interest. In addition, the President pointed to Britain’s partial 
responsibility in this current incident. The US government had 
demanded an ‘assured stoppage’ of Hanoi’s infiltration, but 
Wilson, in his version, transmuted it into ‘an assurance that 
infiltration “will stop”’. Although he was ‘always glad’ to 
know that Britain was in his ‘corner’, Johnson was not about 
to grant anyone America’s ‘power of attorney’.101 
 To rub salt in Wilson’s wounds, another telegram 
from Washington revealed that President Johnson had 
secretly despatched to Ho Chi Minh his version of the Phase 
A-Phase B plan, two days before Wilson had presented 
Kosygin with what he believed to be America’s authentic 
version. Now the Prime Minister understood why the Soviet 
premier had suddenly been so interested in his version of the 
Phase A-Phase B scheme on the 9th. He speculated that Ho 
had informed Kosygin of Johnson’s version and the Soviet 
government had then decided to choose the British version, it 
being the more acceptable of the two to the North 
Vietnamese.102 Wilson felt he had again been made a fool of by 
the American ally.  
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 On the night of the 12th, the final day of the Anglo-
Soviet talks, Johnson made a last-minute attempt to retrieve 
the situation, submitting a new proposal stating that the US 
would not resume the bombing of North Vietnam if Hanoi 
pledged ‘before 10:00 a.m. British time’ on the next day that 
‘all movement of troops and supplies’ into South Vietnam 
would stop ‘at that time’. If this was obtained, the US military 
build-up would then stop ‘within a matter of days’ and 
‘unconditional negotiations’ would follow on ‘a neutral 
spot’.103 In possession of this new proposal, Wilson and Brown 
hurried to Claridges Hotel in London where the Soviet 
delegation was staying. The British leaders urged an 
unenthusiastic Soviet premier to recognise that ‘peace was 
now available and within grasp’ and that ‘the fate of the 
world lay in their hands’. After patient persuasion into the 
early hours of the morning, the Prime Minister and his 
Foreign Secretary finally won Kosygin’s promise to deliver the 
American message to Hanoi.104 
 Obviously, the time allotted to inform and receive a 
response from Hanoi was too short.105 Wilson, Bruce and 
Cooper managed to extract an extension of another six hours 
and, on the morning of the 13th, all in London anxiously 
awaited a reply from Hanoi. Kosygin left Britain at noon. 
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There was still no news. At four o’clock in the afternoon, the 
telephone rang. All remaining hopes of peace were dashed; 
the State Department Operations Center informed London 
that bombing had resumed.106  
 
The Aftermath 
As his remarks at a Cabinet meeting and the House of 
Commons soon after the Anglo-Soviet summit clearly 
indicate, Wilson deplored the loss of a crucial chance for peace 
through an inappropriate American response.107 To 
Washington’s ‘gravest concern’, he told the Commons, ‘there 
were moments’ when a Vietnamese settlement ‘could have 
been very near’.108 Wilson wondered how the US could repeat 
a ‘significant failure in communication’ despite the lessons of 
the Marigold episode. He confessed frankly to Johnson’s new 
National Security Advisor, Walt Rostow, then staying in 
London, that ‘there had been times when he wondered with 
whom he was struggling’.109  
Numerous unanswered questions presented 
themselves to Wilson: why did the US government change the 
Phase A-Phase B formula in the midst of his meeting with 
Kosygin?; was it really because of North Vietnamese 
infiltration, as Washington had insisted?; if the US had been 
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obliged to modify the formula at all, why could it not have 
done so and informed the British of the changes before he 
handed the Soviet premier the obsolete version?110 Possibly, 
was he ‘in fact’ ‘not in the confidence’ of the US President from 
the outset?111 Despite Brown’s advice against ‘run[ning] the 
risks of unnecessarily irritating’ Johnson in further pursuit of 
the case,112 Wilson insisted that the Americans made a full 
investigation into the causes of the miscommunication. 
Whether or not it would ‘irritate the President’, he wanted 
Johnson ‘to be in no doubt of the fact’ that he was ‘worried 
about the way things went during the week’.113 
 Wilson’s indignation at the USA’s misconduct was so 
fierce that he began to doubt the truth of his own assertion in 
the 1966 talks with Kosygin that the UK’s influence with 
America was greatest when it maintained a close relationship 
with Washington. In conversations with Humphrey in early 
April, the Prime Minister once again threatened to ‘adopt a 
slightly more “central position”’ between the two sides of the 
fighting parties in Vietnam than he ‘had done hitherto’. The 
Vice President warned of the danger of Britain’s ‘shift…away 
from Washington and towards Hanoi’. Johnson would, he 
cautioned, take such ally’s action ‘in intensely personal terms’ 
and would have a ‘violent’ reaction if he felt ‘betrayed’ by the 
British. Humphrey tried to appease the Prime Minister by 
                                                 
eJournal of International History (March 2005) 
 38
                                                
reminding Wilson that he was one of the only two allied 
leaders on whom the President ‘could really rely’, the other 
being Harold Holt of Australia.114 
 In contrast to Vice President’s words, however, 
Johnson himself did not have high regard for Wilson’s pains-
taking efforts with the Soviets. Reportedly, he accused Wilson 
of ‘having ludicrously magnified his role to reap a domestic 
political dividend’.115 Furthermore, in an interview with 
Patrick Dean on 10 April, Johnson accepted neither that there 
had been ‘a breakdown’ in Anglo-American communication 
nor that the UK-USSR summit had been a missed opportunity. 
No remarks of regret, let alone of apology, were heard from 
the President during this conversation.116 
 What is notable is that, following the Anglo-Soviet 
summit, Johnson came to the conclusion that ‘mediation in the 
conflict’ by a third party, whether between the US and North 
Vietnam, or between the US and the Soviet Union, was 
‘becoming counter-productive’ and that it ‘tended to create 
confusion and misunderstanding’ about American policy 
‘among world opinion’. ‘[T]he best prospect for the future’ 
instead ‘might well lie in direct contacts’ with Moscow and 
Hanoi.117 In fact, as Ilya V. Gaiduk points out, the US 
governments had been in occasional contact with the North 
Vietnamese Embassy in Moscow via the Soviet government 
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during this period.118 How significant these informal US-
North Vietnamese contacts by Soviet mediation were is still 
unknown, however, given the deteriorating UK-US 
relationship, it would appear that Washington’s policy makers 
judged it better to strengthen communication with the Soviet 
leadership without further involvement from Wilson. 
And, as it happened, the summer of 1967 saw the 
development of direct US-USSR contact. While Wilson 
continued to argue that ‘the key to peace lay through the 
Soviet Union and the key to the Soviet Union lay with 
Britain’,119 American high-ranking officials such as Bundy 
recommended that ‘Johnson to Kosygin [was] a vastly better 
channel than Johnson to Wilson to Kosygin’.120  
 Johnson’s direct request of 22 May to Kosygin for a 
Kremlin exercise of influence on Hanoi met with a positive 
Soviet response.121 About one month later, the Johnson-
Kosygin summit was held, in which the Soviet leader, for the 
first time, offered Moscow’s help in resolving the Vietnam 
conflict from his side. The two superpower leaders shared the 
view that the Vietnam War was undermining the chances of 
US-USSR détente and agreed that finding a solution was in 
their common interest in their search for international 
stability.122 Although, as it happened, this US-Soviet encounter 
did not have any immediate effects on the course of peace-
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making in Vietnam, it is important to note that this direct 
contact of the two leaders considerably reduced the room for 
Britain’s activity as a go-between. When Wilson paid another 
visit to the Soviet capital in January 1968, he found he had 
little impact on the Soviet leadership regarding Vietnam.123 
Moreover, there is no evidence that Britain made any effective 
contribution to the eventual peace talks that began in Paris in 
May 1968. Whether or not it had been a missed opportunity, 
as Wilson claimed, it is certain that the Anglo-Soviet summit 
of February 1967 had been the climax of his own peace-
making efforts. 
 
Conclusion 
Ironically, Wilson’s personal efforts to mediate the 
Vietnamese conflict as a confidant of the United States 
brought to light the widening Anglo-American differences 
over the war. The British Prime Minister was frustrated by 
Washington’s unilateral peace initiatives and regretted the 
lack of Anglo-American orchestration in their foreign policy. 
Given these frustrating episodes, it is possible to speculate 
that Wilson emphasised the UK-US division of function in his 
memoirs in order to highlight the Americans duplicity in their 
relationship with his government. 
 What hindered open communication between the two 
allies in spite of their common desire for a conclusion to the 
Vietnam War? On the side of the United States, one cause of 
miscommunication, beyond simple administrative failures in 
communication, can be found in a tendency to regard 
London’s attempts with the Soviets as ‘a sideshow’ to their 
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own peace efforts, and so no real attention had been paid to 
them in Washington. As Cooper recalls, there was a suspicion 
in the minds of US policy-makers that Wilson’s ‘underlying 
motivation’ for mediation was ‘to bolster his own and 
England’s prestige’ and he was competing for the ‘credit’ for 
peace with the President.124 Behind these US views were their 
cool analysis of Britain’s international standing in the 1960s. 
US Under-Secretary George Ball concluded in a memorandum 
of July 1966, for example, that Britain was ‘no longer the 
center of a world system’ and that it was ‘basically unhealthy 
to encourage the United Kingdom to continue as America’s 
poor relation, living beyond her means by periodic American 
bailouts’.125 With their declining confidence in Britain’s 
international capacity, it was not surprising that the 
Americans were hesitant to stake their security and prestige in 
Vietnam on the British. This lack of American faith in the UK 
is all the more understandable when it is considered that 
Wilson, not infrequently hinting at British dissociation from 
US military actions, did not give the Americans what they 
wanted most on the Vietnamese battlefield. In short, the UK-
US friction occurred in a perception gap in which Wilson 
intended to act as America’s special emissary with her full 
backing, while Johnson perceived the Prime Minister as one of 
his channels to the communist world, alongside others, such 
as the East European countries, the UN and the Pope. 
 This study further suggests that, even with smoother 
Anglo-American communication, Wilson’s efforts would have 
scarcely brought about a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam 
War. Although Wilson continued to believe that peace could 
                                                 
eJournal of International History (March 2005) 
 42
                                                
have been secured had he acquired a 48-hour extension of the 
bombing pause in February 1967,126 his stated conviction 
concealed an important fact from public attention: it was the 
worsening Sino-Soviet confrontation that was as fundamental 
an obstacle to Wilson’s mediating diplomacy as were his 
fluctuating relations with the Johnson administration.127 
The Prime Minister was never sure how much 
influence Moscow would have been able to exert on Hanoi, 
and he was well aware that the intensifying Soviet-Chinese 
rivalry lay in the way of Moscow’s mediation in the war. 
Judging from his recognition of the Soviet-Chinese 
confrontation as ‘the root cause’ of Soviet difficulty with 
active peace-brokering,128 it must have been clear to Wilson 
that his bilateral contact with Moscow, in the absence of any 
approaches to Beijing,129 would yield no effective solution to 
the Vietnam conflict.  
Much is yet to be learned about Moscow’s real 
intentions in Vietnam (and for this we will have to wait until 
the opening of Soviet archives on the war), but the British 
records referred to in this study demonstrate that the Soviet 
leaders were, at the time of Wilson’s peace campaign, 
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preoccupied with competition with the Chinese for Hanoi’s 
favour, and it is hard to imagine that they could have been 
persuaded by the British Prime Minister to become a 
mediator, and risk Chinese accusations. As stated earlier, 
Wilson was apt to take Kosygin’s remarks at face value, and it 
appears that his wish to rely on the Soviets to put him through 
to Hanoi led him to overestimate Soviet relative power in the 
Communist world of the 1960s.  
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